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"To Be Sure He is My Husband Good
Enough,"' or is He? An Analysis of
Common Law Marriage in Pennsylvania
Ryan P. Newell*
I Introduction
On September 17, 2003, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
in PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Stamos)
prospectively abrogated the Commonwealth Court's recognition of
common law marriage.2 The PNC Bank Corp. court inferred from the
most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case dealing with common law
marriage 3 that, given the opportunity, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
4would abrogate Pennsylvania's recognition of common law marriage.
Despite the Commonwealth Court's clear stance on how it will deal with
common law marriage, the PNC Bank Corp. decision has only muddied
the waters of Pennsylvania's longstanding acceptance of common law
marriage.
The general rule in Pennsylvania is that a valid marriage requires a
6marriage license. However, the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; B.A. The University of Notre Dame, 2002. The author wishes to thank
Professor Robert E. Rains, Professor Mary K. Polacheck, the Honorable Kevin A. Hess,
Dale F. Shughart, Jr., Esq., and Judy Swarthout for their insight and assistance. The
author also would like to thank his parents, family and friends for their help and support.
In particular, the author would like to thank his father, Michael K. Newell, Esq., both for
contributing the idea for this comment and for serving as an ideal role model for this
aspiring attorney.
1. Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binn. 405, 406 (Pa. 1814). See infra Part III, section A(1).
2. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1282
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
3. Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998).
4. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1282.
5. Id. at 1274. Pennsylvania has recognized common law marriage claims as far
back as 1814. See infra Part III.
6. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301(a) (2003). "No person shall be joined in marriage in
this Commonwealth until a marriage license has been obtained." Id.
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explicitly state that Pennsylvania accepts common law marriage despite
the license requirement.7 The legislature, 8 the Superior Court9 and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court l° have not abrogated the common law
marriage doctrine. Two key unanswered questions in Pennsylvania
regarding common law marriage are: (1) whether common law
marriages should still be valid, and (2) what effect the intermediate
appellate court decision in PNC Bank Corp. will have on Pennsylvania's
longstanding acceptance of common law marriage.
The Commonwealth Court in PNC Bank Corp. correctly stated that
the time has come for Pennsylvania to abrogate common law marriage."
However, the Commonwealth Court incorrectly analyzed the stance of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on common law marriage and should
have left abrogation to the legislature. 12  Part II of this comment
summarizes the history and rudiments of common law marriage in the
United States. Part III of this comment discusses Pennsylvania's
longstanding acceptance of common law marriage. Part IV of this
comment analyzes Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 3 the most recent
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision on common law marriage. This
analysis shows that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Staudenmayer did not suggest that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would abrogate the doctrine if given the opportunity. Part V of this
comment analyzes the decision in PNC Bank Corp. Finally, Part VI of
this comment illustrates not only why common law marriage should be
abrogated, but also why the PNC Bank Corp. court's analysis of
Staudenmayer was wrong.
II The History of Common Law Marriage in the United States
In her article, "A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, " Cynthia Grant Bowman detailed the history of common law
marriage.14 According to Bowman, marriage began outside the realm of
legal requirements. 5 Formal marriages typically occurred only among
7. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2003). "This part shall not be construed to change
the existing law with regard to common law marriage." Id.
8. Id. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
9. Bell v. Ferraro, 849 A.2d 1233, 1234 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). See supra notes
63-66, 68-75, 89 and accompanying text.
10. Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998).
11. See infra Part VI, section A.
12. See infra Part VI, section B.
13. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016.
14. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 712-70 (1966). Bowman is a Professor of Law at the
Northwestern University School of Law.
15. Id. at 718.
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the wealthy, with the majority of the population relying on informal
unions. 16 Unlike today, the legal authorities of the past had little
connection to the regulation of marriage.' 7 The informal marriage was
predicated upon the couple's agreement to be married, cohabitation, and
the surrounding community's recognition of that couple behaving as a
married couple.1 8
Bowman's research reveals that informal marriage has been the
norm for the majority of human existence with the formal restrictions
representing just a small fragment of human history.19 Prior to Lord
Hardwicke's Act in 1753, England allowed informal, or common law,
marriages to occur via two avenues.20 A common law marriage could be
created when the couple expressed their intent to be married in words of
the present tense.21 Alternatively, a party could become common law
wed through words expressed in the future tense indicating their
intention to wed, followed by consummation by sexual intercourse.22
A. English Influence
The American colonies were split on recognition of common law
23marriage. Some of the colonies resisted common law marriage and
mandated formal requirements.24  Other colonies simply accepted
informal marriage as part of the common law.25 This common law




19. Id. at 718-19. It was not until 1563 that the Roman Catholic Church formalized
its recognition of marriage during the Council of Trent. Similarly, the Church of England
acknowledged informal marriages as late as 1753, at which point Lord Hardwicke's Act
required formal marriage in the Church. Id.
20. Hon. John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-Law Marriage: A
Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine, 29
CUMB. L. REv. 399,402 (1998/99).
21. Id. Courts often use the Latin phrase "sponsalia per verba de praesenti" for
words in the present tense. Id. The English phrase will be used in this comment.
22. Id. Courts often use the Latin phrase "sponsalia per verba de futuro cum
copula" for words in the future tense followed by consummation by sexual intercourse.
Id. Pennsylvania does not recognize words in the future tense as a means to establish a
common law marriage. See infra Part III, section B.
23. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REv. 709, 719 (1966). Bowman points to Massachusetts as one of
the colonies to reject common law marriage. Massachusetts was heavily populated by
dissenters from the Church of England who rejected regulation of marriage by canon law
and favored intricate marriage laws. Id. at 719-20.
24. Id. Conversely, Bowman provides New York as an example of acceptance of
common law marriage in the colonies. Id. at 719-22.
25. Id. at721.
26. Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
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The Fenton court held that formal requirements are unnecessary for a
valid marriage and that words in the present tense will suffice.
2 7
According to Fenton, a marriage in New York could be proved by
"cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgement of the parties, reception in
the family, and other circumstances from which a marriage may be
inferred. 28
Approximately seventy years after Fenton, the United States
Supreme Court recognized common law marriage and set forth some
important principles regarding marriage.29  In Meister v. Moore, the
United States Supreme Court held that marriage is a common right and
that the statutes are only directory. 30 The right to common law marriage
is presumed to exist unless explicitly stated otherwise in a statute.3'
Marriage as a civil contract may be entered into by either adherence to
statutory regulations or through common law marriage.
32
B. Frontier Conditions in the United States
In addition to the English influence on the colonies, the frontier
conditions of the early country led to the acceptance of common law
marriage. 33 The difficulty of entering into a formal solemnization 34 and
the benefits that married life provided in the rough conditions of frontier,
promoted common law marriages.
35
C. Protection of the Family Unit
Acceptance of common law marriage helped with problems
27. Id. at 54. The issue in Fenton was whether a woman was the legal widow of a
man she purported to be married to in order to receive the annuity payments. The man
belonged to a society that provided annuity payments to the widowed spouses of
members. Id. at 52.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877).
30. Id. at 78-81. By directory, the United States Supreme Court meant that statutes
do not grant the right to marriage. A statute describing the methods with which a
marriage may be entered into merely directs citizens as to how they can formally contract
to enter a marriage. Such a statute, unless explicitly stated, does not preclude citizens
from the common law method of achieving the same effect. Id. The Supreme Court here
held that the lower court erred when the jury was instructed that marriage could only be
entered into when a minister or magistrate was present. Id. at 83.
31. Id. at 78.
32. Id.
33. Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 722 (1966).
34. ld. at 722-23. It was difficult to formalize a marriage in the frontiers because
there were few ministers in the lightly populated frontiers. Primitive means of travel
made it difficult to get to the larger cities that had ministers. ld.
35. Id. Marriage was a necessity for frontier men and women because spouses
assisted with the large amounts manual labor involved with frontier life. Id.
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resulting from economically dependent women.3 6  Common law
marriage allowed financially dependent women to look to the family for
financial support as opposed to burdening the state.37 Furthermore,
children of a common law marriage would be regarded as legitimate,
where otherwise they would be children born out of wedlock.3 8 In
addition, courts promoted the marital unit by converting what could be
deemed "subversive relationships" into marriages that satisfied societal
norms.
3 9
II. The History of Common Law Marriage in Pennsylvania
A. Nineteenth Century Beginnings
1. Marriage as a Civil Contract
Just five years after the Fenton v. Reed decision in New York, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced a confusing, yet typical, claim for
common law marriage in Hantz v. Sealy. a° The court reporter noted that
the parties went before a minister in a formal marriage ceremony in 1799
and thereafter lived as husband and wife.4' Despite having children and
acting as a married couple, the parties were aware that the husband had
never been legally divorced from his former wife.42 Sometime after
going before the minister, the husband received a legal divorce from his
prior wife thereby removing any impediment to a potential marriage with
his new partner.43 Through the advice of counsel, the man then spoke the
words of present tense, but when the woman was told to say the same her
response was, "to be sure he is my husband good enough.""
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the principles of
common law marriage when it held that marriage is a civil contract,
"which might be completed by any words in the present time without
36. Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 957, 968-69 (2000). Towns often used public funding to support
widowed and abandoned women. Id.
37. Id. Common law marriage enabled the towns to shift their financial
responsibilities from public funds to a common law husband or to the town in which that
common law husband lived. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. A relationship would be subversive because the couple would be acting in
opposition to "the social and legal institution of marriage." Id.
40. Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binn. 405 (Pa. 1814).
41. Id. at 406.
42. Id. at 406, 408.
43. Id. at 408.
44. Id. at 408-09.
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regard to form."' 45  The concurring opinion more fully addressed the
requisites for a common law marriage, "[a common law marriage] is
binding between the parties, when entered into with full consent per
verba in praesenti.
46
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the marriage was
invalid.47 Not only did the parties lack the intent to become husband and
wife when speaking their words, but the court held that the woman's
words referred to the past contract that the woman viewed as a lawful
marriage. 48 However, that past marriage was void because the man was
still married to another woman at the time. 4 9  Even though the man
obtained a divorce from his lawful wife, both parties had to exchange the
words in the present tense with the intention to be husband and wife
because any reference to the past was a reference to a marriage that never
could have existed.50 Had the parties formalized the marriage before a
minister (for a second time when no impediments existed), no dispute as
to the validity of their relationship would have arisen.5"
2. Marriage Statutes were Ill-Suited to Real Life
In 1833, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that common law
marriage is necessary as an alternative to the strict requirements of the
marriage statutes.5 - According to the Rodebaugh court, decided nineteen
years after Hantz, strict adherence to the marriage statutes would leave
numerous relationships in violation of the law and would leave any
children of such relationships as children born out of wedlock.53 Thus,
45. Id. at 408.
46. Id. at 413. The language of the concurring opinion states a rough formulation of
the rule that the Staudenamyer court would confirm, "a common law marriage does not
come into existence unless the parties uttered the verba in praesenti, the exchange of
words in the present tense for the purpose of establishing the relationship of husband and
wife." Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1021 (Pa. 1998).
47. Hantz, 6 Binn. at 409. Arguably, the court would have recognized the marriage





51. Id. Essentially, the court was saying that the woman's statement indicated a
belief that the relationship up to the point in question was in fact a marriage and
consequently she believed that the man was her husband. The court noted that there was
a void marriage. In order for there to be a marriage from that date on the parties had to
express their intent to take the other as a spouse from thereon out. Id.
52. Rodebaugh v. Sanks, 2 Watts 9, 11 (Pa. 1833).
53. Id. As the Rodebaugh court stated:
"Many provisions in the acts of 1700 and 1729, though doubtless wholesome
when they were enacted, are ill adapted to the habits and customs of society as
it now exists. It is not too much to say, that a rigid execution of them would
[Vol. 109:1
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the Rodebaugh court held that the formal requirements for marriage were
54only directory, not the exclusive means of obtaining a marriage.
B. Confusion in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
A look at two decisions in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court just
seven years apart reveals the confusion the Pennsylvania courts have
faced in applying the doctrine of common law marriage. Consistent with
earlier Pennsylvania case law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1866
in Commonwealth v. Stump held that marriage is a civil contract that can
be entered into through words in the present tense and, absent proof of
such words, proven through reputation and cohabitation.55 Seven years
later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Richard v. Brehm cited to the
holding in Stump, yet without citing any common law precedent, also
held that marriage could be entered into through words in the future tense
56followed by consummation.
By 1960, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reverted back to its
holding in Stump with its decision in Manfredi Estate.57 The Manfredi
Estate court held that a common law marriage is formed: 1) with "the
express agreement of the parties without ceremony;" 2) with words in the
present tense; and 3) with the purpose of establishing a husband and wife
relationship.58  In fact, the Manfredi Estate court explicitly rejected
words in the future tense as a method of entering a common law
marriage. 59 The Manfredi court held that, absent proof of words in the
present tense, a rebuttable presumption in favor of marriage arises when
60there is constant cohabitation and a reputation of marriage.
In light of confusion over the law in the highest court in the state, it
is ironic foreshadowing that the Stump court encouraged parties to avoid
confusion by adhering to formal requirements.
6 1
bastardize a vast majority of the children which have been born within the state
for a half century...."
Id. at 10-11.
54. Id. at 11. For a description of a statute's directory function see supra note 30
and accompanying text.
55. Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132, 136 (Pa. 1866).
56. Richard v. Brehm, 73 Pa. 140, 144 (Pa. 1873).
57. Manfredi Estate, 159 A.2d 697 (Pa. 1960).
58. Id. at 700.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court distinguished "constant cohabitation" from "irregular or inconstant
cohabitation." "Reputation of marriage" means "broad and general" and not "confined to
a few persons." Together, constant cohabitation and reputation of marriage amount to a
rebuttable presumption of marriage, but they do not amount to marriage per se. Id.
61. Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132, 136 (Pa. 1866). The Stump court keenly
noted the potential for confusion with common law marriage claims. The remaining
portion of this comment will detail the struggles the citizens and courts of Pennsylvania
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
C. Dissatisfaction with Common Law Marriage
The twentieth century showed increasing dissatisfaction with
Pennsylvania's acceptance of common law marriage, yet not one court
acted to abrogate common law marriage.62 In Baker v. Mitchell, the
Superior Court noted that there is a great deal of confusion as to what
constitutes a common law marriage.63 In particular, the Baker court
pointed to the incorrect public perception that all cohabiting relationships
between man and woman without satisfaction of a formal marriage
ceremony result in a common law marriage.64  Further, while
Pennsylvania law accepts common law marriages, "they are a fruitful
source of perjury and fraud, and, in consequence, they are to be
tolerated, not encouraged... ,65 Any claim of common law marriage is
to be met with "great scrutiny" and only where it is clear that a common
law marriage was entered into should such a union be acknowledged.66
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirmed the level of scrutiny by
holding that "[t]he law, of necessity, imposes a heavy burden on one who
grounds his claim on an allegation of common-law marriage., 67
By the mid-twentieth century, the Pennsylvania courts had realized
that the need for common law marriage was nonexistent and the law now
stood as an invitation for fraud. 68 The Superior Court in Buradus v.
General Cement Products Co. reasoned that common law marriage in the
present day is an "anachronism" because the problems of frontier life
have been solved by readily available transportation. 69 Despite the heavy
burden placed on claimants, the Buradus court keenly perceived that it is
"still not difficult for unprincipled claimants to convert illicit
relationships into honest marriages, to their advantage, on spurious
claims for workmen's compensation or against the estate of a
decedent.,70  The Buradus court described the Superior Court's
experience with common law marriage claims as unsatisfactory because
spurious claims outweighed the "rarely actual" claim.7' Yet, the Buradus
will have. Finally, the comment calls for an end to common law marriage, which would
avoid the confusion that the Stump court recognized.
62. Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998).
63. Baker v. Mitchell, 17 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Stevenson's Estate, 116 A. 162, 164-65 (Pa. 1922)).
67. Nikitka's Estate, 346 Pa. 63, 67 (Pa. 1943).
68. Buradus v. Gen. Cement Prod. Co., 48 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946).
69. Id. Improved means of transportation made traveling to the location of marriage
officials easier than in frontier times. For the problems of frontier life, see supra Part II,
section B.
70. Buradus, 48 A.2d at 885.
71. Id. at 887.
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court refused to disturb the law because it is the role of the legislature to
abrogate the long accepted common law doctrine.72
Almost forty years later, the Pennsylvania Superior Court again
refused to abrogate Pennsylvania's acceptance of common law
marriage.73 The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the opportunity
to abrogate common law marriage has been before the courts and the
legislature numerous times and that the doctrine had yet to be
abrogated.74 The Superior Court limited its role to the application of the
law by saying that any changes to the law must be left to the legislature.
75
IV. Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer
A. Factual Background
The most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision on common
law marriage, and the decision on which the Commonwealth Court in
PNC Bank Corp. relied, is the 1998 case Staudenmayer v.
Staudenmayer.76 The parties in this case were disputing what constituted
marital property in the equitable distribution proceedings as part of the
divorce action filed by the husband.77  The parties were ceremonially
married in December of 1984, but Linda Staudenmayer claimed a
common law marriage existed as early as 1978; thus, she claimed that a
tort settlement received by Theodore Staudenmayer that settled in April
of 1984 was marital property.78
The decisions in the lower courts and the factual circumstances are
indicative of the confusion surrounding a common law marriage claim.
The Staudenmayers had cohabited since 1976, and had a daughter in
1979. 79 Despite the availability of both parties to testify as to the words
in the present tense, Linda Staudenmayer, as the party claiming a
72. Id. The Superior Court reasoned that abrogation of common law marriage, "will
be exclusively for the legislature to determine." Id.
73. In the Interest of Miller, 448 A.2d 25, 32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
74. Id. The Superior Court stated: "We have not overlooked the arguments of
counsel for appellant's mother, urging that we re-examine the doctrine of common law
marriage, and either abolish it or align the age of consent to that required for statutory
marriage. (citation omitted). However, we have declined previous opportunities to
abolish or modify the doctrine of common law marriage. Past efforts in the Legislature to
abolish common law marriage have failed." Id.
75. Id. "If common law marriage is to be abolished, or the requirements for entering
into it changed, it must be done by the Legislature, not the courts.... Our responsibility
is to interpret and apply the law. If a marriage is lawful, that is the end of the inquiry."
Id.
76. Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998).
77. Id. at 1018.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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common law marriage, instead attempted to prove a common law
marriage through cohabitation and reputation. 80  She offered up
behaviors that are similar to those of a married couple: use of the same
surname, joint accounts, ownership of a marital residence, and jointly
filed tax returns. 81
However, while the Staudenmayers for the most part presented
themselves as husband and wife prior to 1984, Linda never told her
parents that they were married.82 Linda even referred to the date of their
marriage in 1984 as "the date for legal purposes, 83 apparently unaware




The trial court held that Linda had failed to prove "clearly and
convincingly" that words in the present tense had been exchanged.85 The
trial court was not satisfied that Linda had proven that the reputation was
broad and general8 6 because her immediate family was unaware of the
marriage prior to the December 1984 ceremony. 87  Thus, the tort
settlement obtained before the formal marriage was deemed separate
property.
88
The Superior Court reversed, holding that Linda had met her burden
of proving a common law marriage through "numerous, objective indicia
of marriage."8 9 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was left
with the issue of whether a common law marriage existed.9°
C. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Holding
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Superior Court because Linda failed to prove clearly and convincingly
that Theodore and she had exchanged words in the present tense.91
Furthermore, Linda was not entitled to the rebuttable presumption of a




83. Id. at 1019.
84. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
85. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1019.
86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.




91. Id at 1022.
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cohabitation and reputation is available only when testimony as to the
exchange of words in the present tense is unavailable.9 2
In its analysis, the Staudenmayer court set forth the common law
doctrine, but from the outset the court said, "[w]hile we do not today
abolish common law marriages in Pennsylvania, we reaffirm that claims
for this type of marriage are disfavored. 93  The Staudenmayer court
reiterated that Pennsylvania courts view common law marriage claims
with hostility due to the potential for fraud, that the claimant has a heavy
burden, and that such claims are reviewed with "great scrutiny." 94 The
Staudenmayer court was similar to earlier Pennsylvania courts that have
disfavored common law marriage claims.9 5
D. Only Two Justices Supported Abrogation
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Castille, Justice Nigro
advocated the abrogation of common law marriage in Pennsylvania.
96
Justice Nigro supported his position for abrogation by using supporting
language from courts in other jurisdictions. 97 Justice Nigro cited various
reasons for abrogation of common law marriage: it is an antiquated law;
common law marriages are "uniformly misunderstood;" formal
marriages are not costly;98 the pioneer conditions that necessitated
informal marriages are gone;99 common law marriages promote a lack of
commitment;100 and the doctrine allows for fraudulent claims.0 1 Justice
92. Id. The court held, "Here, Linda was available to testify, and did testify,
concerning the exchange of verba in praesenti between her and Theodore. She simply
did not do so convincingly, and therefore did not meet her burden." Id.
93. Id. at 1019-20. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the validity of the
common law doctrine was not an issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which is
why the issue of abrogation was not addressed. Id. at 1020 n.4.
94. Id. (citing Estate of Wagner, 159 A.2d 495, 497 (Pa. 1960); Estate of Gavula,
417 A.2d 168, 171 (Pa. 1980)).
95. See supra Part III, section C.
96. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1022 (Nigro, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 1022 (Nigro, J., concurring). See Orsbum v. Graves, 210 S.W.2d 496
(Ark. 1948) (stating that the pioneer conditions that necessitated common law marriage
no longer exist); Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992 (D.C. 1977) (stating that common law
marriage is an antiquated law which is misunderstood and serves little purpose); Dunphy
v. Gregor, 643 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (stating that common law marriage has an inherent
nonrecognition of the legal process and results in relationships lacking in commitment);
Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that common law marriage
does not properly separate false claims of marriage from legitimate claims); Nestor v.
Nestor, 472 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 1984) (stating that, "[t]he days of the walking preacher
and of the bishop on horseback are long gone.").
98. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d at 1022-23 (Nigro, J., concurring) (citing Johnson v.
Young, 372 A.2d 992, 995-96 (D.C. 1977) (citation omitted)).
99. Id. at 1023 (Nigro, J., concurring) (citing Osburn et al. v. Graves, 210 S.W.2d
496, 498 (Ark. 1948)).
100. Id. (Nigro, J., concurring) (citing Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 382 (N.J.
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Nigro opined that official records should determine the existence of a
marriage, not the Pennsylvania judiciary's interpretation of facts 1
0 2
V. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
(Stamos)
According to the Commonwealth Court, "the continued viability of
the doctrine of common law marriage" was "left open" after
Staudenmayer.10 3 What was considered "left open" after Staudenmayer
was closed (at least in the Commonwealth Court) 10 4 as the PNC Bank
Corp. court held that it abrogated common law marriage in the
Commonwealth Court, though it gave the holding a "purely prospective
effect.", 5
A. Factual Background
The factual history in PNC Bank Corp. is illustrative of the
problems the Commonwealth Court sought to remedy. In 1994, Janet
Stamos, who worked for PNC Bank, was killed in an airplane crash.1
0 6
In 1997, John Kretz filed a claim for Stamos's death benefits from PNC
Bank claiming to be the common law husband of Stamos.10 7 Kretz's
claim came before a Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ). 10 8 To prove
a common law marriage through words in the present tense, Kretz
admitted into evidence an affidavit that both Stamos and he signed.'09
The affidavit from December 22, 1990, stated that the parties had
expressed the words in the present tense with the intent of being husband
and wife, that the parties had held themselves out as husband and wife,
and that the only way to remove Stamos from the plan would be through
legal divorce proceedings. 01 The affidavit set June 15, 1988, as the date
that Kretz and Stamos entered into their common law marriage."'
1994)).
101. Id. (Nigro, J., concurring) (citing Morone v. Morone 413 N.E. 2d 1154, 1157
(N.Y. 1980)).
102. Id. (Nigro, J., concurring).
103. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1272
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
104. See infra Part VI, section B(3).
105. Id. at 1282. That is, the common law marriages entered into prior to this holding
would be valid, but any entered into after this holding would be not be recognized in the
Commonwealth Court. Given the purely prospective approach, the Court had to
determine whether a common law marriage existed in this case. Id. at 1282-86.
106. Id. at 1272.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Despite the apparent clarity of the affidavit, Kretz's testimony
revealed that the actual date of the marriage was one year later, in
1989.112 In fact, Stamos could not have entered into the marriage in 1988
because she was still married to another man as of December of 1988.113
Regardless of the date, Kretz testified that the parties signed the affidavit
so that Stamos would be financially protected in case tragedy struck
Kretz.114 Kretz contended that the parties were financially dependent
upon each other. 15 He offered evidence of activities and trips taken by
the couple. 16 Kretz also testified that he served as the intermediary
between the airline and Stamos's family after her death."'
Despite the parties' intention to establish a common law marriage,
they maintained separate bank accounts, filed separate income tax
returns, and mortgaged their house under one party's name. 1 8 Further,
Kretz and Stamos did not share any jointly owned assets or debts." 9
PNC even pointed to Stamos's death certificate that claimed she was
divorced with no surviving spouse.
120
B. Procedural History
The WCJ found that the parties had expressed the words in the
present tense in June of 1989 and reaffirmed their intentions in
December of 1990 when they signed the affidavit.12' Thus, the WCJ
determined that Kretz, as the common law husband of Stamos, was
entitled to the surviving spouse's benefits. 2  The Workers'
Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirmed the WCJ's decision.
23
From the Board's decision, PNC Bank appealed to the Commonwealth
Court. 124
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1273 n.3.







121. Id. at 1274.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1272.
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C. The Commonwealth Court's Decision
1. Common Law Marriage Is Abrogated in the Commonwealth
Court
In the Commonwealth Court, PNC Bank argued primarily that
common law marriage should be abrogated. 125 In the alternative, PNC
Bank argued that Kretz had failed to meet the heavy burden of proof
necessary in the case of common law marriage.
26
The PNC Bank Corp. court began with a historical analysis of
common law marriage.' 27 In particular, the court relied heavily upon the
historical information presented in Professor Bowman's article, A
Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage,128 and Ariela
R. Dubler's article, Wifely Behavior. A Legal History of Acting
Married. 1
29
Emerging from the historical analysis, the PNC Bank Corp. court
focused on criticisms of the doctrine of common law marriage. 130 The
PNC Bank Corp. court cited to Pennsylvania case law stating that
common law marriage is "an anachronism in the present day-born as it
was of the exigencies of pioneer life.. ,.131 Furthermore, the PNC Bank
Corp. court reasoned that, "[t]he law of Pennsylvania recognizes
common law marriages. But they are a fruitful source of perjury and
fraud, and, in consequence, they are to be tolerated, not
encouraged.... ,,132
In abrogating common law marriage,' 33 the PNC Bank Corp. court
relied upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Staudenmayer.34  The PNC Bank Corp. court inferred from the
Staudenmayer decision that the time had come for common law marriage
to be abrogated. 35 Although the issue of abrogation was not before the
Staudenmayer court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1274-75.
128. Id. at 1275-77. See Bowman, supra note 14.
129. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1275-79. See Dubler, supra note 36.
130. PNCBank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1277-81.
131. Id. at 1278 (citing Buradus v. Gen. Cement Prod. Co., 48 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1946)).
132. Id. (citing Manfredi Estate, 159 A.2d 697, 700-01 (Pa. 1960) (citation omitted)).
133. Id. at 1282. The decision of the Workers Compensation Judge was upheld
because the court reasoned that the affidavit and testimony were sufficient to establish the
burden of proof. Id. at 1283-86
134. Id. at 1278-79.
135. Id. at 1279 (citing Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019-20 (Pa.
1998)).
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doctrine's "continued viability is seriously in question', t36 and Justice
Nigro encouraged its abrogation in his concurring opinion.
37
With the issue of abrogation of common law marriage before the
Commonwealth Court, the PNC Bank Corp. court examined various
reasons for abrogation. 38 First, single women are no longer viewed as a
burden on the state and are now eligible to receive child support
regardless of marital status. 139 Second, eligibility for inheritance rights
of children no longer bears any relation to the marital status of their
parents. 140  Third, access to ceremonial marriages is cheap, quick, and
simple. 141 Fourth, couples can solemnize their own marriage once they
have obtained certification that no impediments exist. 1
42
The PNC Bank Corp. court also illustrated numerous advantages to
abrogating common law marriage.1 43  Adherence to statutory
requirements provides the courts with a bright line standard. 
144
Abrogation would reduce litigation and prevent fraudulent claims.
145
Furthermore, abrogation would clear up confusion as to what the law
is, 146 and as a result would protect innocent parties in vulnerable
situations due to misguided reliance. 147 In addition, the PNC Bank Corp.
136. Id. (citing Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1020 n.4 (Pa. 1998)).
137. Id. (citing Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1023 (Pa. 1998)
(Nigro, J., dissenting)).
138. Id.
139. Id. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4323(b) (2003) ("In making an order for the
support of a child, no distinction shall be made because of the marital status of the
parents.").
140. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1279. For purposes of intestate succession,
children born out of wedlock will be treated as the child of their mother and father. 20
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2107 (2003). "Parents are liable for the support of their children who
are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321(2)
(2003). "All children shall be legitimate irrespective of the marital status of their parents,
and, in every case where children are born out of wedlock, they shall enjoy all the rights
and privileges as if they had been born during the wedlock of their parents except as
otherwise provided in Title 20 (relating to decedents, estates and fiduciaries)." 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5102(a) (2003).
141. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1279. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303 (2003) (A
license will be issued three days after an application for a license has been made. In
emergency circumstances, a license can be granted immediately.); see also 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1105(a); see infra note Part VI, section A(2).
142. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1280 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502 (2003)).
See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502(a) ("In all cases in which the parties intend to solemnize
their marriage by religious ceremony without officiating clergy, the marriage shall not
take place until their right to do so is certified in a declaration in substantially the
following form ...").
143. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1280.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1280-81 (citing Baker v. Mitchell, 17 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941)).
147. Id.
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court noted that the advanced role of women has resulted in a greater
need for third parties to know the marital status of people. 148
Finally, the PNC Bank Corp. court reasoned that common law
marriage gives parties the opportunity to use the doctrine as a "legal
raincoat.' ' 149 The PNC Bank Corp. court exhibited disdain for parties
who use the doctrine to receive benefits of being married when it suits
them, only to deny their marriage when it is not favorable. 50 For
example, one party's family might not condone the marriage making it
better to tell the family they were not married, while the parties would
otherwise represent themselves as married in order to receive certain
financial benefits. 151 The PNC Bank Corp. court refused to support a
doctrine that allowed such disrespect for the law.' 
52
2. Anticipatory Overruling
Despite the reasons for abrogating common law marriage,15 3 the
PNC Bank Corp. court realized that its decision to abrogate the doctrine
would be contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal to do
so. 154  Not finding any support for such action in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the PNC Bank Corp. court looked to federal courts that
have held that "anticipatory overruling" may at times be both permissible
and obligatory. 155 The PNC Bank Corp. court reasoned that "anticipatory
148. Id. at 1281. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that a third party needs to
ascertain a person's marital status because that person's rights in relation to the third
party are often contingent upon marital status. The court gave the example that, in the
past, third parties interested in engaging in a business transaction would only evaluate the
creditworthiness and earning capability of the husband. Now, the court reasoned, third
parties will need to know whether the party is contracting as a member of a married
couple because of the effect on creditworthiness and earning capability. A marriage
license provides third parties with an immediate answer, while a common law marriage





153. See supra notes 130-152 and accompanying text.
154. PNCBank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1282.
155. Id. See U.S. v. Girouard, 149 F.2d 760, 765-67 (1st Cir. 1945) (Woodbury, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Congress did not intend to restrict conscientious objectors from
naturalization, "[n]othing is to be gained by our deciding a question contrary to the way
we think the Supreme Court would decide it."); Salerno v. Am. League of Prof I Baseball
Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that "we continue to believe that the
Supreme Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions, save
perhaps when opinions already delivered have created a near certainty that only the
occasion is needed for pronouncement of the doom."); Specter Motor Serv., Inc. v.
Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., dissenting) (stating that "I agree that
one should not wait for formal retraction in the face of changes plainly foreshadowed; the
higher court may not entertain an appeal in the case before the lower court, or the parties
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overruling" should only be employed in the "extraordinary
circumstance" where there can be no doubt as to how the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would decide the issue. 156 The court reasoned that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Staudenmayer, "has raised the
overruling axe so high that its falling is just about as certain as the
changing of the seasons." 157 The PNC Bank Corp. court reasoned that
this was such an "extraordinary circumstance;" therefore, it would no
longer recognize common law marriages. 118
VI. Analysis of PNC Bank Corp. & Common Law Marriage
Although common law marriage should be abrogated in
Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth Court in PNC Bank Corp. should have
left abrogation to the legislature, especially because its analysis of the
Staudenmayer holding is misplaced.
A. Common Law Marriage Should be Abrogated in Pennsylvania
Common law marriage should be abrogated by the legislature.
1 59
The law should be purely prospective: abrogating common law
marriages from the date of enactment, but leaving all common law
marriages entered into prior to that date as valid. In addition, full faith
and credit 160 should be given to all common law marriages entered into in
jurisdictions that recognize common law marriage.' 61 Only marriages
may not choose to appeal."); see also Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court
Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L.
REv. 53 (1982).
156. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2dat 1282.
157. Id. (citing Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 667 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
158. Id.
159. Because common law marriage has been relied on by the citizens of
Pennsylvania, an effort must be made to make people aware that they can no longer enter
into common law marriages. See House Judiciary Committee Task Force on Family
Law: Hearing in HB. 316, Session of 2001, 11-14 (statement of Robert E. Rains,
Esquire, Professor of Law and Co-Director, Family Law Clinic Pennsylvania State
University Dickinson School of Law). Mailings and postings at common spaces
throughout the state are one idea. Local representatives should also have a role in
effectuating the spread of the new law. It is especially important that there not be any
reliance when the law no longer allows for common law marriage.
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
161. The Commonwealth Court in PNC Bank Corp. did not address the validity of
marriages entered into in other states. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1282 n.80 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). For more information on
full faith and credit of marital laws, see Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for
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entered into in Pennsylvania pursuant to title 23, section 1301 of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes should be recognized as valid.
162
1. Abrogation Promotes Judicial Efficiency
A brief overview of Pennsylvania common law marriage cases
demonstrates that fact-sensitive claims of this sort are judicially
cumbersome.163  Removing the potential for common law marriage
claims would leave the courts with a clear-cut determination as to
whether and when a party was married. Marriage records offer the court
a bright line rule to follow. If parties want the benefits of being a
married couple, then they should have to adhere to the statutory
requirements. 164
A simple act of abrogation would immediately end any potential
claims from the date of enactment.' 65 Parties would no longer be able to
use common law marriage as a "legal raincoat."' 166 A couple who wants
the benefits of being married would have but one choice: to formally get
married.1 61 Courts would no longer have to separate fraudulent claims
from valid claims of marriage. The marriage records would solve that
problem in a quick and decisive manner.
Part of the reason that courts have had such difficulty with common
law marriage cases is because the doctrine is confusing.' 68 If the courts
have struggled to apply the correct law, then ordinary citizens cannot be
expected to know if they are common law married. A simple statutory
requirement that conforms to majority practice in the nation would be
much simpler for the citizens of Pennsylvania. Instead, common law
marriage casts a shadow of uncertainty over relationships not
ceremonially entered into. What good is a law designed for people to
Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 307 (1998).
162. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 (2003). See supra note 6.
163. See supra Parts III-V.
164. See supra note 6.
165. The General Assembly could simply repeal common law marriage by amending
the language of 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2003) to read, "common law marriage is not
recognized as valid. Only common law marriages validly entered into in Pennsylvania
prior to the date of enactment and common law marriages validly entered into in a
jurisdiction that recognizes common law marriages will be recognized as valid in this
Commonwealth."
166. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
167. Parties electing not to get married may not be unprotected. In Pennsylvania,
"agreements between nonmarried cohabitors fail only to the extent that they involve
payment for sexual services." Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983). The Knauer court's holding protects agreements made between nonmarried
cohabitors, not agreements made between nonmarried cohabitors and third parties. Id.
168. See supra Part Ill, section B.
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self-implement if it is almost impossible to understand?
2. The Need for Common Law Marriage No Longer Exists
The frontier conditions 169 that once necessitated common law
marriages no longer exist. With increased ease of transportation, the
citizens of Pennsylvania can readily travel to an official 70 who can
solemnize a formal marriage ceremony.' 71 A marriage license fee of
three dollars is minimal. 172 Furthermore, the license does not impinge on
a couple's choice of how they want to enter into a marriage because
parties can either go before an official or marry themselves. 7 3 The PNC
Bank Corp. court correctly reasoned that the only difference between
common law marriage and a statutory marriage is the requirement for
witnesses and a license. 174 Requiring such minimal effort for the benefits
of marriage is not much to ask, especially when adherence to the statute
will improve judicial efficiency.
3. Common Law Marriage Is Now Less Beneficial to Both Men
and Women
In part, courts created common law marriage to entitle women and
children to the support they would otherwise be denied due to the status
of single woman or the status of a child born out of wedlock.
75
Common law marriage also entitled children born out of wedlock to
inheritance rights.' 76 Today, a child can receive support and inheritance
regardless of whether the child's parents are married to each other.
77
169. See supra Part II, section B.
170. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1503 (2003). Officials who can solemnize a marriage
include: justices, judges, district justices, magistrates, mayors, ministers, rabbis, and
priests. Id.
171. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1279
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
172. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1105(a) (2003). "The fee to be charged for issuing a
marriage license or declaration and for returns thereof to the department shall be $3 of
which $2.50 shall be retained by the county wherein the license is issued and 50 shall be
remitted to the Commonwealth." Id.
173. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1502-03 (2003). Pennsylvania entitles members of
religious organizations to marry themselves in accordance with the rules of their religion
as long as they obtain the proper marriage certificates. Id. See supra note 142 and
accompanying text.
174. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1280.
175. Id. at 1279.
176. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 139-40. See also 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2107 (2003). For more
information on the rights of children born out of wedlock, see Timothy G. Barrett, Is
Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children Worthy of Stricter Scrutiny Under the
Constitution?-The Relationship Between State Intestate Succession Statutes and the
Social Security Act In Claims for Child Benefits for Illegitimate Children, 33 U. OF
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While common law marriage still offers protection to some,
common law marriage nonetheless poses a threat to men and women
alike. A person who never exchanges words in the present tense with his
or her partner, but relies on promises from the partner that a marriage
exists, is left in jeopardy should the person ever need to prove a
marriage. 178  A marriage license assures a couple of their marital
status. 179 Without a license, cohabiting nonmarried parties can only hope
that courts will enforce any agreements made between them.180
Furthermore, the confusing nature of common law marriage may trap
parties in relationships which they believe to be common law marriages.
Strict adherence to the license requirement1 8' would alleviate any of
these concerns.
4. The Effect on Third Parties is Greater Now'
82
The PNC Bank Corp. court reasoned that third parties are burdened
by the existence of common law marriage because third parties now deal
with both husband and wife, as opposed to just the husband when the
doctrine was first created.1 83  In this day and age of business, full
disclosure of marital status is important. A simple marriage license
circumvents any of the potential confusion that may be created with a
common law marriage scenario. Reducing such burdens on third parties
is a sufficient reason to abrogate common law marriage in light of the
acceptable statutory alternative-the marriage license.
1 84
5. Common Law Marriage Does Not Promote Respect for the
Law
The common law marriage doctrine invites parties to use the
doctrine to their benefit without fully accepting the consequences. The
PNC Bank Corp. court used the term "legal raincoat" to describe the
actions of parties who choose to avow a common law marriage when it
LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 79 (1994).
178. See supra Part IV, section C and note 167.
179. See supra note 6.
180. See supra note 167.
181. See supra note 6.
182. For more information on third parties, see Heidi J. DeBernardo, Pennsylvania's
Workers Comp. Law: An Examanition of Key Changes Made to Supersedeas Proceedings
by Act 57 of 1996, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 881 (1997); Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled
Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1987); Ruth
Ben-Israel, Social Security In the Year 2000: Potentialities and Problems, 16 COMP. LAB.
L. 139 (1995).
183. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1281
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
184. See supra note 6.
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benefits them, but to disavow it when it does not. 8 5 A sampling of
Pennsylvania cases reveals that many common law marriage claims
involve parties claiming marital status for financial benefits but denying
marital status at other times.186 A common law marriage is a marriage in
every sense of the word.187  Abrogating common law marriage, as
proposed, would still allow any willing man and woman who meet the
requirements of marriage to enter into marriage, but it would remove the
possibility that marriage could be used fraudulently. Allowing for such
abuse of the law, when a viable alternative exists, is intolerable.
B. The PNC Bank Corp. Court Should Have Left Abrogation to the
Legislature
1. The Analysis of the Staudenmayer Court was Wrong
In her dissent in PNC Bank Corp., Judge Doris A. Smith-Ribner
correctly noted that only Justices Nigro and Castille voted to abrogate
common law marriage while the five other justices did not. 188 Two out
of the seven justices does not mean that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
"has raised the overruling axe so high that its falling is just about as
certain as the changing of the seasons."1 89  The majority's language
disfavoring common law marriage is consistent with the Pennsylvania
judiciary's hesitant toleration of common law marriage claims, and while
the issue of abrogation was not before the court, it is important to note
that the Supreme Court did not even suggest that common law marriage
should be abrogated. 90 Dicta is not binding' 91 and reliance upon such
185. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
186. See Richard v. Brehm, 73 Pa. 140 (Pa. 1873) (defendant explicitly denied
marriage to his partner's sister, but claimed common law marriage to receive by devise
real estate owned by his alleged common law wife); Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714
A.2d 1016 (Pa. 1998) (appellee did not tell immediate family members about the
marriage, but claimed common law marriage to receive tort settlement); Baker v.
Mitchell, 17 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941) (appellant did not tell immediate family
members about the marriage, but claimed common law marriage to receive death
compensation); In re Estate of McNeil, 56 Pa. D. & C.4th 77 (Ct. Com. P1. 2001)
(petitioner considered herself single for government documents, but claimed common
law marriage in order to receive death certificate for alleged common law spouse killed in
the September 1 1th terrorist attacks).
187. Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998). "Marriage in
Pennsylvania is a civil contract by which a man and a woman take each other for husband
and wife. (citation omitted) There are two kinds of marriage: (1) ceremonial; and
(2) common law. (citation omitted)" Id.
188. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1286 (Smith-Ribener, J., dissenting).
189. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part III, section C.
191. Hunsberger v. Bender, 180 A.2d 4, 6 (Pa. 1962).
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dicta in a two-justice concurring opinion should not be a basis for an
intermediate court to overrule the highest court in the State.
2. Judicial Activism is Wrong
Judge Smith-Ribner noted that the intent of the legislature has been
to retain common law marriage. 92 Following the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision in Staudenmayer, both Chambers of the General
Assembly introduced bills to abrogate common law marriage in
Pennsylvania. 93 However, none of these bills were enacted and title 23,
section 1103 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes remains
unchanged as common law marriage is still recognized in the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.
1 94
In addition to the resistance from the legislature, the
Commonwealth Court upheld a common law marriage in 2000 in
Brandywine Paperboard Mills v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Board
(Zittle).'95 The holding is not unusual because common law marriages
were recognized in all Pennsylvania courts as well as the state
legislature. 196  What is unusual is that the opinion in Brandywine
Paperboard Mills is completely devoid of any indication that the
Commonwealth Court disfavored common law marriages--even though
the case was decided two years after Staudenmayer.197 The Brandywine
Paperboard Mills court did not even suggest an action by the legislature
to abrogate common law marriage.198 In essence, the Commonwealth
192. PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1287-88 (Smith-Ribener, J., dissenting).
193. See H.R. 43, 1999 Gen. Assem., Sess. of 1999 (Pa. 1999); S.P. 814, 1999 Gen.
Assem., Sess. of 1999 (Pa. 1999); H.R. 316, 2001 Gen. Assem., Sess. of 2001 (Pa. 2001);
S.P. 1233, 2001 Gen. Assem., Sess. of 2001 (Pa. 2001); H.R. 1233, 2001 Gen. Assem.,
Sess. of 2001 (Pa. 2001); H.R. 2271, 2002 Gen. Assem., Sess. of 2002 (Pa. 2002).
194. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2003). Following the Commonwealth Court's
decision in PNC Bank Corp., bills in both the House and Senate of the General Assembly
of Pennsylvania have been proposed. Both bills propose a prospective abolishment of
common law marriage in Pennsylvania. As of the date that this comment was sent to
publication, neither have been signed into law. See H.R. 2165, 2003 Gen. Assem., Sess.
of 2003 (Pa. 2003); S.P. 985, 2003 Gen. Assem., Sess. of 2003 (Pa. 2003). However, on
May 11, 2004, the Pennsylvania Senate passed Senate Bill 985 with a 49-1 vote. Jan
Murphy, Senate OKs end to common-law marriage, THE PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg,
PA), May 11, 2004, at B1. Despite the resounding support received in the Senate, there
was concern in the Senate that the House would hurt the bill's chances of becoming law
by including controversial same-sex marriage provisions in the bill. Id. The bill was
before the House when this comment was sent to publication.
195. Brandywine Paperboard Mills v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Zittle), 751 A.2d
1205 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
196. See supra note 6 and Parts III-IV.
197. See Brandywine Paperboard Mills v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Zittle), 751
A.2d 1205 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
198. See id.
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Court's opinion in Brandywine Paperboard Mills is nothing more than a
rudimentary application of the common law doctrine.199 With continued
200legislative inaction z, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in
Staudenmayer,20 1 and the Commonwealth Court's silent acquiescence in
the common law marriage doctrine in Brandywine Paperboard Mills,
20 2
the Commonwealth Court's decision in PNC Bank Corp.20 3 came as a
great surprise.
The legislature makes the law of Pennsylvania, °4 and it has chosen
not to change the common law marriage doctrine. 20 5 It is the judiciary's
role to interpret the law,2°6 not to make it. The PNC Bank Corp. court
erred by ignoring both the statutory recognition of common law
marriage 20 and the judicial precedent of leaving any changes to the
doctrine to the legislature.20 8
3. The PNC Bank Corp. Court has Confused the Law in
Pennsylvania
By usurping the powers of the legislature, the Commonwealth Court
left the viability of common law marriage in Pennsylvania in question.
While the Superior Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed
as to the existence of a common law marriage between Linda and
Theodore Staudenmayer, both courts recognized the existence of
common law marriage in the law 20 9 and neither holding went as far as the
PNC Bank Corp. court.210 The PNC Bank Corp. court expressly stated
that it will no longer recognize common law marriage claims brought
199. See id.
200. See supra note 193.
201. See supra Part IV, section C.
202. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part V, section C.
204. PA. CONST. art. II, § I "The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be
vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." Id.
205. See supra note 7.
206. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1 provides:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial
system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the
Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal
and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be
provided by law and justices of the peace. All courts and justices of the peace
and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system.
Id.
207. See supra note 6.
208. See supra Part III, section C.
209. See supra Part IV.
210. See supra Part V, section C.
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before the Commonwealth Court.21" ' Since neither the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court212 nor the legislature have acted in response to the PNC
Bank Corp. court's holding, it is difficult to determine where the law
stands.
Given the unique structure of Pennsylvania's court system, common
law marriage cases can arise under the jurisdiction of both the
Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court.21 3 After the PNC Bank
Corp. case, the Superior Court in Bell v. Ferraro has stated that it is not
bound by the Commonwealth Court's decision.21 4 Noting that both the
Superior Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have declined to
abrogate common law marriage, the Bell court heard a common law
marriage case and applied the law as developed in the Superior Court and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.21 5
211. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1282
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
212. The time to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court is thirty
days after the entry of the order of the Commonwealth Court. 11 PA. R.A.P. 1113 (2003).
PNC Bank elected not to appeal within the allotted thirty days. Robert E. Rains, Adding
Uncertainty to Uncertainty About Common Law Marriage, 25 PA. FAM. LAWYER 101,
103 (2004). The Supreme Court could have assumed jurisdiction over this case even if
there was not an appeal. However, the Supreme Court did not assume King's Bench
jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court may
on its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before
any court or district justice of this Commonwealth involving an issue of
immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any
stage thereof and enter a final order or otherwise cause right and justice to be
done.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 726 (2003). For more information on the King's Bench
jurisdiction, see Alexandra Makosky, The King's Bench Power in Pennsylvania: A
Unique Power That Provides Efficient Results King 's Bench Power in Pennsylvania, 101
DICK. L. REV. 671 (1997). See also, Bernard F. Scherer, The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and the Origins of King's Bench Power, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 525 (1994).
213. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 741, 742, 761, 762, 763, 764 (2003). Pennsylvania
has two intermediate appellate courts, the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court.
The difference, essentially, is that the Commonwealth Court deals with all civil cases in
which the state government or any officer of the state government is a party. The
Superior Court has jurisdiction over cases involving all other parties. Both courts receive
appeals from the Courts of Common Pleas and both can have cases appealed to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id. However, the Superior Court will hear more
domestic relations cases than the Commonwealth Court. Robert E. Rains, Adding
Uncertainty to Uncertainty About Common Law Marriage, 25 PA. FAM. LAWYER 101,
102 (2004). The Commonwealth Court will likely hear common law marriage cases
similar to the PNC Bank Corp. case where the party is seeking compensation from a
government body. Common law claims raised in Superior Court will be between
individual citizens, as in a divorce case based on a common law marriage.
214. Bell v. Ferraro, 849 A.2d 1233, 1234 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
215. Id. The Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
that no common law marriage existed. Id. at 1235. The Superior Court found that the
appellee's testimony that the marriage was not entered into with the requisite intent was
more credible than the appellant's testimony that the intent was present when the words
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While the Commonwealth and Superior Courts will treat common
law marriage claims differently,2 16 it remains to be seen how the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will handle a common law marriage claim.
It is uncertain whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will give any
deference to the Commonwealth Court's holding in PNC Bank Corp.
Most likely, if given the opportunity, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
will overturn the PNC Bank Corp. court because the Staudenmayer court
did not stand for the proposition that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would abrogate common law marriage if given the opportunity.21 7
Regardless, all that is clear is that the law is unclear.
VII. Conclusion
The PNC Bank Corp. court was correct in holding that common law
marriage should be abrogated.2 18  The legislature should abrogate
common law marriage for various reasons. First, adherence to the
license requirement in Title 23, section 1301 of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes would promote judicial efficiency because courts
would not have to engage in fact-intensive inquiries for common law
marriage claims.2 19  Second, the need for common law marriage no
longer exists because all citizens can avail themselves of the formal
marriage requirements. 220 Third, common law marriage no longer
protects men or women as it did in the past.221 Fourth, the effect on third
parties is greater now than when the courts created common law
marriage. 222 Finally, common law marriage promotes disrespect for the
law.2 2 3
Although the PNC Bank Corp. court was correct in its reasons for
abrogating common law marriage, it should have left abrogation to the
legislature.2 24 The Commonwealth Court's analysis of Staudenmayer
was misplaced.2 25  The majority in Staudenmayer did not give any
indication that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would abrogate common
in the present tense were exchanged. Id. The parties entered into an "Affidavit of
Common Law Marriage," but the Appellee testified that this agreement was entered into
only to allow the Appellant to be added to the Appellee's health insurance plan. Id. at
1234-35.
216. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text, Part IV, and Part V, section C.
217. See supra Part VI, section B(1).
218. See supra Part VI, section A.
219. See supra Part VI, section A(l).
220. See supra Part VI, section A(2).
221. See supra Part VI, section A(3).
222. See supra Part VI, section A(4).
223. See supra Part VI, section A(5).
224. See supra Part VI, section B.
225. See supra Part VI, section B(1).
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law marriage if given the opportunity, but in dicta only two concurring
justices encouraged abrogation.226 The Commonwealth Court should not
have relied on the dicta of two concurring justices 27 from Staudenmayer
to abrogate a longstanding common law doctrine.228 In addition, judicial
activism is wrong because the legislature is the law making branch and it
has chosen not to abrogate common law marriage. 229 Because of the
holding in PNC Bank Corp., the status of common law marriage in
Pennsylvania is uncertain.
230
It is time for the Pennsylvania General Assembly to end the
confusion existing around common law marriage by abrogating it.
231
See id.
See supra note 191.
See supra note 5. See also supra Part III.
See supra Part V1, section B(2).
See supra Part VI, section B(3).
See supra Part VI, section A.
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